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The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze: (1) the effect of managerial 
ownership on agency costs, (2) the effect of institutional ownership on agency costs, and 
(3) the effect of managerial ownership and institutional ownership simultaneously affect 
to agency costs. This research was conducted at the primary industrial sector and 
chemical of manufacturing companies that listed on the Indonesia stock exchange 2014-
2016. The companies analyzed amounted to 18 companies determined based on 
sampling criteria. The analysis method used is panel data analysis by using Eviews 9 
programming computer. The results of this study found that managerial ownership has 
an insignificant relationship with agency cost. The institutional ownership has an 
insignificant with agency costs. The managerial ownership and institutional ownership 
have no significant effect on agency costs, simultaneous. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current business development is so competitive that it makes most public companies 
separate the relationship between the parties that provide capital to the company with the 
parties that managing company. The separation of this relations is known as the agency 
relationship, the relationship that occurs when one party, in this case, is called the principal 
(owner) uses another party called the manager (agent) to manage the company for the benefit 
of the owner. On the other hand, the manager is also a party that seeks to maximize self-
interest. This difference of interest is the basis for the conflict between the principal and the 
manager known as the agency conflict. 
Managers do not always act best for the benefit of shareholders, but rather lead to self-
interest. It is unlikely that the owner without the cost of obtaining confidence that the manager 
will take the optimal decision in accordance with the principal's point of view. The agency 
conflict between the principal and the manager (agent) causes the principal to issue a number 
of costs called agency cost (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Roshanawaty (2012); and Tumiwa 
(2013)) 
Agency costs are the costs incurred by shareholders to ensure that management actions 
are in the best interests of shareholders. Handoko (2014) argued that agency cost is the cost 
incurred to reduce agency problems that include the cost of monitoring, bonding and residual 
loss. Agency costs may arise when the agent's interests are not aligned with the interests of the 




and conflicting decisions that may reduce the welfare of the principal (Sadewa and Yasa, 2016). 




greater the agency costs, the more disadvantageous to shareholders because of the 
greater the cost to shareholders for managers but not in line with the performance of managers. 
Agency cost is a decline in prosperity experienced by the principal because of the difference 
between the goal of the principal party with the agent. 
The phenomenon of increasing agency costs that are potentially harming shareholders 
occurs in manufacturing companies, especially manufacturing companies in basic and chemical 
industry sectors. 
The average percentage change in agency costs projected with Selling and General 
Administrative (SGA) Expense of manufacturing companies in basic and chemical industry 
sector from 2014 to 2016 continues to increase. In 2014 to 2015, the average percentage of 
SGA expense change is increased by 25.64% from 0.078 to 0.098, while in 2015, the 
percentage in 2016 from SGA expense changes by 83.67% from 0.098 to 0.180 (Mumu, 2017). 
The greater the ratio of SGA expense then the agency cost of the company getting 
bigger. The higher the shareholder costs to oversee and ensure the actions of managers to act 
in accordance with the shareholders, such as auditing, high salary and adequate facilities, but 
not in line with the performance of managers in generating sales. This can be detrimental to 
shareholders because all of the company's operational funds include agency cost derived from 
funds invested by shareholders. With higher agency costs, shareholders expect a high return on 
sales (Rahmadiyani, 2012) 
Theoretically, the ownership structure of a company is considered as a mechanism to 
reduce the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and minimize agency costs. 
The ownership structure is divided into managerial ownership and institutional ownership. 
Managerial ownership is a situation where a manager owns a company's stock (Sari, 
2015). While Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by institutions such as banks, 
companies, and investment institutions. 
Another problem that arises is the inconsistency of research results conducted by 
researchers on the relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs. According to 
Arumsari, Djumahir and Aisjah (2014), Kusuma and Wayan (2013), and Roshanawaty (2012) 
found that managerial ownership negatively affects agency costs. By contrast, Handoko (2014) 
and Riali (2016) found that managerial ownership had no effect on agency costs. 
The inconsistency of the results of this study also occurs in the relationship between 
institutional ownership of agency costs. According to Handoko (2014) and Riali (2016), 
instutional ownership does not affect agency costs. On the other hand, Rahmadiyani (2012), 
Kusuma and Wayan (2013), and Roshanawaty (2012) found that institutional ownership 
negatively affects agency costs. 
The objectives of the study were to (1) to determine whether managerial ownership 
affects the agency cost, (2) to find out whether institutional ownership affects agency costs, (3) 
to know whether managerial ownership and institutional ownership together affect the agency 
costs of manufacturing companies. 
The results obtained will be used as an information and input for investors and corporate 
decision makers to address agency costs in manufacturing companies and to address the 
inconsistencies of previous research on the relationship between managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership and agency costs. In addition, it can be used as study material for further 
research in researching the same problems in the future 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the context of financial management, an agency relationship emerges between 
shareholders and managers and shareholders with creditors. The relationship between 
shareholders and managers arises when shareholders authorize managers to manage the 
company. Agency relations occur when one or more shareholders (principal) hire another 
person (agent) to provide services and then delegate decision-making authority to the agent. 
This relationship raises the tendency of different interests because in principle people will try to 
maximize utility for self-interest  (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Hadiprajitno (2013)). 
Managers are entrusted by shareholders to manage the company in the hope of 
maximizing shareholder wealth, but in reality, there is often a conflict of interest between the 
principal and the agent known as the agency problem. The agency problem can be divided into 
two categories. First, known as adverse selection, occurs when an agent fails to provide his or 
her ability and tends to make adverse decisions and secondly, known as moral hazard is an 
environmental condition in which the agent neglects responsibility, or acts for his or her own 




According to Septiawan and Wirawati (2016), agency conflict is caused by differences in 
interest and information asymmetry among shareholders with management. Asymmetric 
information is a condition in which one party has more information than the other. In this case, 
the management has more information than the shareholders. 
Shareholders want managers to work with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth, but 
otherwise, corporate managers may act not to maximize shareholder wealth but maximize their 
own prosperity. Examples include the use of unfavorable cash flows and different funding 
decisions. Where shareholders want funding companies to use debt and retained earnings are 
distributed in the form of dividends whereas managers want the company's funding to be 
derived from retained earnings because if it uses the risk debt borne by large managers. This 
difference of interest is most likely to occur because managers do not have to bear the risks as 
a result of mistakes in business decisions as well if managers can not increase shareholder 
wealth because the risk is fully borne by shareholders. This difference is what underlies the 
incidence of costs called agency cost. 
Agency costs represent costs incurred by the conflict between shareholders and 
managers (Arumsari, Djumahir and Aisjah, 2014). Agency cost is divided into three, namely: (1) 
Monitoring Cost, is the cost of monitoring agent behavior issued by the principal to measure, 
monitor and control agent behavior. (2) Bonding Cost, is the cost of the engagement issued to 
ensure that the agent will not take any action or decision that will harm the principal and the 
agent will also compensate if the loss occurs, (3) Residual Loss, is the value of losses 
experienced by the principal due to decisions are taken by agents that deviate from decisions 
are made by principals (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Riali (2016), 
Agency costs according to cost type can be grouped into three, namely: First, the cost of 
monitoring by the principal in the form of cost measurement and evaluation of agent (manager) 
performance. Second, the cost of the guarantor (manager) in the form of stock options, 
bonuses, salary and luxurious facilities. Thirdly, residual losses that may be in the form of risks 
borne against unpaid debts and the cost of bankruptcy. 
The agency cost is the cost or risk that occurs when the shareholder pays the manager to 
undertake an assignment in which the manager's interests are contradictory or inconsistent with 
the interests of the shareholders (Riantani, Rahmawati and Sodik (2015)). Agency costs refer to 
costs resulting from a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. According to 
Septiawan and Wirawati (2016), Agency costs are the costs incurred in order for managers to 
act in harmony with the owner's goals. So it can be concluded that agency costs are the costs 
incurred by shareholders to ensure that the actions of managers do not harm shareholders. 
There are several factors that influence the agency cost, among others are (1) 
Managerial Ownership, i.e. share ownership by the management. Managerial ownership can 
align the position and unify the goals between shareholders and managers so that they act in 
accordance with shareholders who are nothing but themselves. According to Ahmad and 
Septriani (2008) with an increase in the percentage of ownership, managers are motivated to 
improve performance and are responsible for increasing shareholder wealth so as to minimize 
agency costs. (2) Institutional ownership, i.e. share ownership by a particular institution or 
company. Ownership by an institution is relatively large, so institutional ownership leads to 
optimally supervised manager performance and avoids the opportunistic behavior. By involving 
institutional ownership, managers act in accordance with shareholder wishes thereby reducing 
agency costs (Bathala in Ahmad and Septriani, 2008). 
 
Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is the percentage of share ownership by management that actively 
participate in corporate decision making. Managerial ownership describes a dual role as 
managers of companies (managers) and owners of companies (shareholders). Managerial 
ownership is a situation where a manager owns a company share (Sari 2015). 
Managerial ownership is the ownership of the company's shares by the manager or in 
other words the manager as well as the shareholder. Companies with high managerial 
ownership will make the agency cost in the company low, because of the possibility of pooling 
interests between shareholders and managers with a dual function as agent and principal. It 
means that managerial ownership in a company will encourage the unification of interests 
between the principal and the agent so that managers act in accordance with the wishes of 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling (1976); Suryani and Redawati (2016)). According to Kusuma 




commissioners and the board of directors. So it can be concluded that managerial ownership is 
the ownership of shares by the management company. 
 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares of companies owned by institutions 
and institutions such as insurance companies, banks and investment companies. Institutional 
ownership has significance in monitoring or monitoring management actions. The existence of 
institutional ownership will encourage more optimal supervision. 
Institutional ownership is owned by companies or institutions such as insurance 
companies, banks and other institutional ownership. While Kusuma and Wayan (2013) say that 
institutional ownership is the ownership of shares of companies majority owned by institutions or 
institutions both engaged in finance and non-financial. The existence of institutional ownership 
is a means to monitor the management of opportunistic actions by managers (Rahmadiyani 
2012). Supervision by the institution is driven by the number of funds they invest in a company. 
A high degree of institutional ownership will result in greater oversight by institutional investors 
in order to impede opportunistic behavior of managers. Thus, such supervisory mechanisms will 
ensure an increase in shareholder wealth. 
Involving institutional ownership, managers act in accordance with shareholder wishes 
thereby reducing agency costs. Institutional ownership is defined as the proportion of share 
ownership by the end of the year owned by institutions such as banking, insurance or other 
institutions. So it can be concluded that institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by an 
institution such as  the insurance company and bank. (Ahmad and Septriani, 2008) 
 
Hypothesis 
H0 = Managerial ownership has an insignificant effect on agency costs. 
H1 = Managerial ownership has a significant effect on agency costs. 
 
H0 = Institutional ownership has an insignificant effect on agency costs. 
H2 = Institutional ownership has a significant effect on agency costs. 
 
H0 = Managerial ownership and institutional ownership simultanously no effect on agency 
costs. 




This study is a quantitative study with an associative hypothesis to examine the effect of 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership on agency costs. The dependent variable in 
this study is agency cost, which is defined as the cost incurred by shareholders to ensure that 
the actions of managers do not harm shareholders. Agency costs are measured using Selling, 
General and Administrative expenses to sales ratio. The formula for finding SGA expense to 
sales ratio is as follows: 
 𝑆𝐺𝐴 ݁𝑥݌݁݊ݏ݁ ݐ݋ ݏ𝑎݈݁ݏ ݎ𝑎ݐ𝑖݋ =  𝑆݈݈݁𝑖݊𝑔, 𝑔݁݊݁ݎ𝑎݈ 𝑎݊݀ 𝑎݀݉𝑖݊𝑖ݏݐݎ𝑎ݐ𝑖𝑣݁ ݁𝑥݌݁݊ݏ݁𝑆𝑎݈݁ݏ  
 
Independent variables in this study are managerial ownership and institutional ownership. 
Managerial ownership is defined as share ownership by the management company. Managerial 
ownership can unite the interests of shareholders and managers so that the agency problem will 
be overcome which also affects the decrease in agency costs. Managerial ownership can be 
obtained by the following formula: Managerial ownership =  number of managerial sharesnumber of outstanding shares × ͳͲͲ% 
 
Institutional ownership is defined as ownership of shares by an institution or institution 
such as an insurance company, a bank and so on. The existence of institutional ownership 
serves as an effective monitoring mechanism for any manager's decisions, and actions that will 
reduce the level of shareholder prosperity and the manager is expected to act in accordance 
with the interests of shareholders. The amount of institutional ownership can be determined by 




 Institutional ownership =  number of institutional sharesnumber of outstanding shares  × ͳͲͲ% 
 
The population in this study is the basic and chemical manufacturing companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2014-2016 as many as 68 companies. Sampling technique using 
purposive sampling method is the technique of determining the sample with certain 
considerations (Sugiyono, 2014). 
The criteria in the sample used are basic, and chemical sector manufacturing companies: 
(1) listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2016, (2) publish financial statements in 
2014-2016, (3) have ownership of managerial data and institutional ownership in 2014 -2016. 
Companies that have been sampled according to criteria there are 16 companies. 
The analysis used in this research is panel data analysis that combines time series and 
cross section data. Panel data analysis is used to observe the effect of one dependent variable 
with one or more independent variables. Data processing is done by using computer program 
eviews 9. 
The use of panel data can provide statistical and economic theoretical advantages, 
among others: (1) Panel data is able to account for explicit individual heterogeneity by allowing 
individual specific variables to make panel data can be used to test and build behavioral models 
more complex. (2) If the specific effect is significantly correlated with other explanatory 
variables, then the use of panel data will substantially reduce the omitted variables problem. (3) 
Panel data based on repeated cross section observation, so that panel data method is suitable 
for the study of dynamic adjustment. (4) The high number of observations has implications for 
more informative, more varied data, decreasing collinearity among variables, and increasing 
degrees of freedom, in order to obtain more efficient estimation results. The above advantages 
have implications for the unnecessary testing of classical assumptions in the panel data model. 
This research was conducted at IDX Manado representative office in February to April 2018. 
 
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Analysis Results 
    
     SGA? KM%? KI%? 
    
     Mean  0.118772  3.509652  44.24221 
 Maximum  1.647261  22.05012  89.46863 
 Minimum  0.011033  0.004608  1.963611 
 Observations 54 54 54 
 Cross sections 18 18 18 
Source: Data processed 
 
From table 1 above can be seen that the company studied 18 companies with 
observations of 54. Companies that become research samples have an average value of SGA 
expenses of 0.118772. The low average SGA Expense states that the companies study 
samples have a low average agency cost. The minimum SGA Expense value is 0.011033, and 
the maximum value is 1.647261. The smaller SGA Expense indicates that management is more 
efficient in the use of the cost or the cost used to improve the performance of the company and 
not solely for personal gain management. On the contrary, the greater the SGA Expense 
indicates that expenditures are solely for the personal interest of management. The lowest 
value of SGA Expense is owned by TBMS (PT.Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk) company in 
2014, and the highest value is owned by IKAI (PT.Inti Keramik Alam Asri Industri Tbk) in 2016. 
For managerial ownership variables (KM), the average sample research company has 
managerial ownership of 3.509652%. This percentage indicates that the average sample 
company has a percentage of managerial ownership of 3.509652% in its ownership structure. 
While the minimum managerial ownership value of 0.004608% is owned by AMFG company 
(PT.Asahimas Flat Glass, Tbk) in 2014 until 2016 means that the ownership of AMFG company 
shares is only 0.005000% owned by the management of the year from 2014 until 2016. And the 
value managerial ownership of 22.05012% is owned by SRSN company (PT.Indo Acitama, Tbk) 




management in 2016. With the increasing of managerial ownership will increasingly align the 
interests between the management and shareholders so the agency costs will decrease. 
For the institutional ownership variable (KI) the average of the research sample is 
44.24221%. The percentage indicates that the average sample company has a fairly large 
percentage of institutional ownership of 44.24221% in its ownership structure. The minimum 
value of 1.963611% of institutional ownership owned by BTON company (PT. Beton Jaya 
Manunggal, Tbk) in 2014 to 2016 means BTON company's share ownership of 1.964000% is 
owned by institutes from 2014 to 2016. For maximum value Institutional ownership of 
89.46863% owned by YPAS company (PT. Yana Prima Hasta,Tbk) from 2014 to 2016 means 
that the ownership of YPAS company is 89.46863% owned by the institution. High institutional 
ownership will encourage more optimal supervision of any manager actions that can harm 
shareholders, thereby lowering agency costs. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 2. Panel Data Test Results (Random Effect Model) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 0.121645 0.079079 1.538282 0.1302 
KM? 0.000716 0.007093 0.100888 0.9200 
KI? -0.000122 0.001470 -0.082797 0.9343 




Source: Data processed 
 
T-test 
This T-test is conducted to determine the effect of managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership on agency cost at a significant level α = 0,05 (5%) partially by using random effect 
model. 
Based on table 2 above can be seen that the probability value for Managerial Ownership 
variable is equal to 0.9200 where the value is greater than α = 0.05 or 5% so H0 is accepted and 
H1 is rejected. 
Thus, managerial ownership has no significant effect on agency costs or in other words 
managerial ownership is not a significant explanatory variable against agency costs. 
Increasingly, managerial ownership will not affect the increase or decrease of agency cost. 
In table 2, it can be seen that the probability value of institutional ownership variable is 
0.9343 greater than α = 0.05 or 5% (0.9343> 0.05) so H0 is accepted and rejects H1, with the 
value indicating that institutional ownership has no significant effect on the agency cost. 
Institutional ownership is not yet a significant explanatory variable of agency costs, the higher 
institutional ownership in a firm will not affect the increase or decrease in agency costs. 
 
F-Test 
This test is conducted to determine the effect of managerial ownership, and institutional 
ownership on agency cost simultaneously at a significant level α = 0.05 or 5% using a random 
effect model. 
From table 2, it can be seen that the probability value of f-statistic is 0.990838. This value 
is above the significant level α = 0.05 or 5%, which is 0.990838> 0.05 so that according to the 
testing criteria hence H0 is accepted and H1 is rejected. This indicates that jointly variable 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership have no significant effect on agency cost. The 
growing proportion of managerial ownership and institutional ownership will have no effect on 
the rise or fall of agency costs. 
 
The Influence of Managerial Ownership Against Agency Costs 
Managerial ownership is the ownership of shares by the management. Managerial 
ownership is considered to unite the goals of shareholders and managers because by giving 
stock options managers and shareholders positions will be balanced. Managers are no longer 
merely as corporate managers but also as owners of companies (shareholders) so that agency 
conflicts will be minimized and have an effect on decreasing agency costs. 
The result of the study found that managerial ownership positively insignificant effect on 
agency cost. This shows that managerial ownership has no significant effect on agency costs. 




agency costs. The existence of a proportion of ownership rights by managers is considered to 
unite the purpose between shareholders and managers so that the agency costs will decrease it 
does not provide assurance that the manager will work in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders. 
No significant effect of managerial ownership on agency costs is due to the average of 
basic and chemical industry manufacturing companies having low managerial ownership of 
3.5% that can not overcome the difference in goals between shareholders and managers and 
lower agency costs. Not significant was also due to data from 18 firms over three years of 
observation having the same amount of managerial shareholdings. Namely as follows: 
PT.Alkindo Naratama,Tbk; PT.Alumindo Light Metal,Tbk; PT.Asahimas Flat Glass,Tbk; 
PT.Beton Jaya Manunggal,Tbk; PT.Duta Pertiwi Nusantara,Tbk; PT.Mulia Industrindo,Tbk; 
PT.Pelat Indah Canindo,Tbk; PT.Tembaga Mulia Semanan,Tbk and Yana Prima Hasta Persada 
Tbk have the same number of shares outstanding for three consecutive years. In addition, there 
are companies experiencing losses of PT.Inti Keramik Alam Asri Industri,Tbk in 2016 so the 
possibility of making the results of research becomes insignificant. 
This study is consistent with Handoko's (2014) study which found that managerial 
ownership positively insignificant to agency costs but inconsistent with Kusuma and Wayan 
(2013) and Roshanawaty (2012) studies. 
 
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Agency Cost 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by an institution, institution or company. 
Increased institutional ownership will have an impact on the stronger level of control that the 
stakeholders (institutional parties) have on manager behavior aimed at minimizing agency 
conflict and also reducing agency costs. Encouragement of the institution to supervise the 
behavior of managers due to the relatively large proportion of shares owned by the institution. 
The result showed that managerial ownership was not an only insignificant but also had 
a negative sign. The size of institutional ownership has no significant effect on the rising or 
decreasing agency costs. Institutional ownership is not able to be a controller against manager 
behavior because the institution is not included in the company's management, so the higher 
institutional ownership does not guarantee the manager to take actions that do not harm the 
shareholders. 
The results of the study are not significant institutional ownership of agency costs 
because the institution is not included in the management of the company, which manage and 
take every decision of the company is the manager, so the higher institutional ownership does 
not guarantee the manager to make decisions and actions that do not harm the shareholders. 
Not significant could be attributed also to the fact that the number of institutional ownership 
shares of 18 research sample firms over three years of research has the same magnitude. For 
example, PT.Alkindo Naratama, Tbk has the same number of shares of institutional ownership 
for three years of research which is 58.406%. Thus the same proportion of institutional 
ownership annually can lead to insignificant results. In addition, institutional ownership only 
invests in the company and is not involved in the decision-making process undertaken by 
management. The presence of companies that suffered losses is also likely to cause 
insignificant research results. 
This study is in line with research of Riali (2016) which found that institutional ownership 
has no significant effect on agency costs and is inconsistent with research of Kusuma and 
Wayan (2013), Rahmadiyani (2012) and Roshanawaty (2012). 
 
The Influence of Managerial Ownership and Institutional Ownership Against Agency Cost 
The results of data analysis simultaneously show that managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership have no significant effect on agency cost. This indicates that managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership will have no effect on the rising or falling agency costs. 
Managerial ownership and institutional ownership have not been able to reduce agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers. 
As partial test results, the insignificant effect of managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership on agency costs is due to the same proportion of managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership in 18 research samples over three years of observation. And also with 
the company that suffered losses during the observation year of research. Thus making the 
results insignificant. 




and institutional ownership have no significant effect on agency costs and are contradictory to 




First. Managerial Ownership has an insignificant effect on agency costs. Managerial 
ownership is not a significant explanatory variable against agency costs. The results found that 
the large or small proportion of managerial ownership had no significant effect on agency costs. 
Hence, the first hypothesis (managerial ownership has a significant effect on agency costs) is 
rejected. Managerial ownership is not able to minimize agency conflicts that lead to decreased 
agency costs in basic and chemical industry manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 2014-2016. 
Second, this research also finds that Institutional Ownership has no impact on the agency 
cost in basic and chemical industry manufacturing companies listed on the BEI in 2014-2016. 
Institutional Ownership is not a significant explanatory variable against agency costs. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis (Institutional Ownership has a significant effect on agency costs) is 
rejected. The results of the study found that the size of institutional ownership had no significant 
effect on the rise or fall of agency cost. In other words, institutional ownership has not been able 
to solve agency conflicts and minimize agency costs. 
Finally, simultanously, Managerial Ownership and Institutional Ownership have no 
significant effect on agency costs. The value of managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership have no significant effect on agency costs. Thus, the third hypothesis (managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership simultaneously affect the agency costs) is rejected. 
Managerial ownership and institutional ownership together do not affect the agency costs of 
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